Booger McLovin

I’m writing this article with the idea that we exist in a universe that has a genuine appearance of being finely tuned for not just intelligent life, but life in general. I concede that there are rational explanations that could account for this universe being a random consequence of a multiverse, but I advance beyond that for two reasons: A. We have yet to show that to be true. B. Even if a multiverse existed, I would further question the mechanism by which the characteristics governing each of these universes are defined.

My entire intention isn’t to prove God’s existence. Instead, I believe that through reductive reasoning, one can eventually arrive at no other conclusion.

In the world we live, I have found that there are some things that are objectively true regardless of any of our opinions. To deny the existence of objective truth, one must attempt to make an objectively true statement. Thus, the proposition “there are no objective truths” is self-defeating.

If a proposition is objectively true, it does not require human minds to believe it is true. Thus, it raises the next question: What makes an objectively true proposition true?

If objective truths genuinely exist independently of human minds, then we must ask what ultimately grounds their truth. Let’s use 2+2=4 as an example. 2+2=4 whether a human mind recognizes it or not, whether it was true before the existence of human minds, or whether human minds existed at all. If this is genuinely an objective truth, then what makes it true? To say that it simply is does not explain why it is true.

The skeptic might say that 2+2=4 is merely invented or conceptualized by the human mind. But while the symbols, terminology, and perhaps even the particular way we conceptualize mathematics may be products of human minds, that does not explain why the underlying mathematical relationship would be true independently of those minds. We may conceptualize a truth without being the source of that truth.

The necessary character of some objective truths is further illustrated by the classical laws of logic. These same laws are required in order to acquire knowledge. Our 2+2 example is a perfect illustration. We can objectively know that 2+2=4. It cannot ever equal 5. Someone can conceive in their mind the proposition “2+2=5,” but conceiving a contradiction does not make the contradiction true. You can describe or imagine a contradiction, but you cannot provide a possible state of affairs in which 2+2 is both 4 and 5 in the same respect and at the same time.

We clearly exist in a universe that is dependent upon a series of contingent physical realities. Everything that begins to exist has a cause that brought that thing into existence. But what about immaterial realities like objective truth?

If something is truly objective, its truth cannot change based upon our opinions or circumstances. If it could change, then what we called objective truth would ultimately be subjective or contingent upon something else. Therefore, when we are confronted with objective truth, we seem to encounter realities that do not depend upon our minds or our preferences to be what they are.

I further recognize that if these truths are genuinely necessary and not caused by anything within the physical universe, then their truth cannot be contingent upon the physical universe. They would therefore have to possess their truth necessarily rather than contingently. This raises an important question: How can necessary truths ultimately depend upon a reality in which everything else appears to be contingent?

Consider the multiverse. Even if we granted that multiple universes exist, it would seem that the physical laws and constants governing each universe could differ. If so, could something that is objectively true in our universe be false in another? Could 2+2 equal 4 here but 2+2 equal 5 somewhere else?

I find that conclusion implausible. If 2+2=4 is objectively and necessarily true, then it is not merely a local feature of our particular universe. It could not become false simply because we crossed some cosmic boundary into another universe. The truth of a necessary proposition cannot be contingent upon which universe we happen to inhabit.

This is one of the reasons I find the multiverse insufficient as an ultimate explanation. Even if a multiverse could explain why our particular universe appears finely tuned for life, it does not answer the deeper question of what grounds the necessary truths by which we recognize and reason about any universe at all. It may simply move the explanatory question one level higher.

And this is where my argument ultimately leads. If there are eternal, necessary, immaterial truths that do not depend upon human minds or physical reality, then I believe we must ask whether the best explanation for those realities is an eternal, necessary, rational mind capable of grounding them.

So let’s do some reductive reasoning. While I will only present a few options, I would argue that you can test any worldview you want using the same method and very likely arrive at the same conclusion I have. We will operate on a bottom-up path, beginning with the way a person actually uses the tools of reason and knowledge, and then working downward through the assumptions necessary to make that usage possible until we run out of road and are forced to confront the ultimate foundation of those assumptions.

The goal is not to begin by assuming God and then force every observation to fit that conclusion. That would be a top-down approach that begins with the conclusion rather than allowing the conclusion to emerge from the investigation. Instead, we will begin with things we already use and recognize: reason, knowledge, objective truth, logic, and our experience of reality. We will then ask what each worldview must presuppose in order for those things to be intelligible. We continue downward until we either arrive at a sufficient foundation or discover that the worldview ultimately terminates in an unexplained or contradictory conclusion. 

If we reach absurdity, we should not rescue the worldview by simply adding another unsupported assumption. We should follow the argument where it leads and recognize that the worldview has failed to account for the existence of these transcendental properties.

Naturalism proposes that our universe is composed ultimately of matter and the physical realities described by the natural sciences. I think the issue with this worldview is glaring. Matter is contingent and subject to change, whether through decay, fusion, transformation, or any number of physical processes. More importantly, matter itself does not appear to possess the necessary, immaterial characteristics we find in transcendental properties. Objective truth does not decay, fuse, transform, or cease to be true. The proposition 2+2=4 does not become less true because matter changes.

Therefore, if transcendental properties are genuinely objective, necessary, and immaterial, contingent physical matter cannot by itself be their sufficient metaphysical ground. To argue that naturalism adequately grounds the existence of objective truth would therefore require us to explain how contingent, material reality can account for necessary, immaterial truth.

The naturalist might argue that objective truths are necessary and simply call them brute facts. But this is lacking as an explanation for what grounds their truth. To say that 2+2=4 simply exists necessarily does not tell us why this particular necessary relationship is true rather than some other relationship. If objective truth is ultimately just a brute fact of reality, then the naturalist has reached the point where explanation simply stops. The question remains: what accounts for the existence and necessary character of these truths in the first place?

If the answer is that they simply exist without explanation, then the naturalist has not grounded objective truth. He has merely declared it to be a brute feature of reality. But this leaves the naturalist with an unresolved problem concerning the acquisition of knowledge. If objective truths exist independently of our minds, then what accounts for the ability of contingent human minds to apprehend and know those truths? Simply declaring objective truth to be a brute fact does nothing to explain the correspondence between our minds and an objective reality that exists independently of them.

The problem becomes even greater when we consider meaning and value. If meaning and value are ultimately nothing more than conceptual constructions produced by human minds, then they have no objective existence beyond those minds. Our sense of purpose, agency, and value would ultimately be something we have assigned to ourselves rather than something grounded in reality itself. We may experience these things as real, but the naturalist must explain why we should regard them as objectively true rather than merely useful human concepts.

And remember, concepts may have no correspondence to reality at all. We can easily conceive of a contradiction, but we cannot execute a concept in the real world that contains a genuine contradiction. The mere fact that something can be conceptualized therefore tells us nothing about whether it is objectively true or corresponds to reality. If meaning, value, and truth are ultimately products of human conceptualization, then they become relative to the minds doing the conceptualizing. I therefore reject conceptualization alone as a sufficient explanation for objective reality.

In conclusion, the naturalist is unjustified in their attempt to adequately ground their own presuppositions when accounting for their knowledge. This is not to say that the naturalist cannot have or acquire knowledge. They clearly can. The problem is that naturalism cannot adequately account for the existence of objective truths without appealing to something beyond the naturalistic framework itself. In doing so, the naturalist risks borrowing intellectual capital from a worldview capable of providing the metaphysical grounding that naturalism itself cannot supply.

This is one of the reasons many philosophically trained atheists and agnostics have gravitated toward Platonism.

Plato recognized the need for a metaphysical ground beyond the changing physical world to account for realities that transcend human opinion and physical circumstance. He sharply criticized the traditional conception of the Greek gods and developed a philosophical account of reality in which the changing world participates in or reflects higher, unchanging realities.

Plato proposed that realities such as truth, goodness, and mathematical relationships cannot ultimately be reduced to the changing physical world. Instead, some form of necessary abstract reality must exist independently of the physical world. Plato was most certainly on to something when he proposed this.

The issue, however, is that abstract realities themselves possess no causal power. The number 4 cannot cause my mind to understand that 2+2=4. The proposition cannot reach into my mind and produce knowledge of itself. An abstract object can perhaps explain what is true, but it does not obviously explain how a contingent, physical human mind comes to know that truth. Therefore, the Platonist is unjustified in their attempt to adequately ground their own presuppositions when accounting for their knowledge. Again, it’s not that I am saying a Platonist has no ability to have or acquire knowledge. I am merely pointing out that the Platonist has failed to provide a sufficient metaphysical explanation for the existence of these transcendental properties and our ability to know them without borrowing intellectual capital from competing worldviews. 

Maybe at this point you are asking why I am pursuing a metaphysical explanation for the existence of objective truth. It would be a fantastic question, for sure. My mind is unsatisfied with any idea of an impersonal cause for all that exists, both material and immaterial. I would hope you would agree that an answer to this cause would be desirable.

I did not become a Christian because of this argument, and neither will you. Instead, the purpose of this article is merely to challenge your mindset, your presuppositions. Maybe you are too skeptical. Yes, there is such a thing. Maybe you think you are too analytical and demand proof before committing to a worldview like mine. But what if I were to tell you that proof is an illusion?

You see, the idea of knowledge is quite challenging to me. I can purchase a Powerball ticket today and tell you I am almost completely certain I will not win, but there is still a chance that I will. I would argue that metaphysical realities operate within the same idea of knowledge. It’s not to say that we cannot know God. We can. It’s just to say that if you desire for me to prove God’s existence, then I must tell you rightly that I cannot. I can, however, point you to the One who can, and that is God Himself.

This leads me to the Christian route of finding a metaphysical agent capable of grounding transcendental truths. The Christian worldview provides, in my view, the most adequate account of the personal nature of transcendental realities. I say personal with intention, because the transcendental properties we have been discussing are not merely abstract descriptions of reality. They include rationality, truth, knowledge, meaning, and value.

If I reject the idea of a material world grounding transcendental truths, then I am left asking what kind of reality could ground them. An eternal, necessary, immaterial, unchanging, rational mind provides an explanation that neither naturalism nor impersonal Platonism appears capable of providing. On this account, transcendental truths are not independent realities existing alongside God. They are ultimately grounded in God’s nature.

On the flip side, I do, however, want you to understand why I became a Christian. It had little or nothing to do with philosophical arguments like TAG or fine-tuning. It had everything to do with the fact that I truly believe that Jesus rose from the dead. As ludicrous as that might seem, I believe it is the only rational explanation for what happened after His death.

Pragmatically, I have found Christianity to be quite rewarding. Not financially, but in life. It’s not to say that everyone who professes faith is rewarded the same. We are all given what we need. I needed God. Everything else merely fell into place after I found Him.